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204 Abstract
Pension reforms, which imply a reduction in the generosity of pension benefits, are 
becoming widespread in response to the demographic transition. The scale, the 
timing, and the pace of these reforms vary across countries. In this theoretical arti-
cle, the authors analyse individual migration decisions, by adding a component 
linked to the expected old-age pension benefits in sending and receiving countries 
in two cases: when the pension system rules are known, and when there is a risk of 
pension systems reforms. The results indicate that when individuals fail to take 
future pension wealth into account, they can make sub-optimal migration decisions.
Keywords: migration decisions, pension benefits, pension reforms, institutional 
uncertainty
1 INTRODUCTION
Public pension systems and public finance in general have been suffering from the 
consequences of the demographic transition; namely, from the disappearance of 
the demographic dividend, whereby the presence of a large younger generation in 
the labour market enabled countries to provide relatively generous pensions to 
older generations. The easily available and cheap method of rolling public debt is 
no longer effective.1 In response to this shift, countries are looking for ways to 
reduce public expenditures, which generally include reforming the pension sys-
tem, either currently or in the future. In the latter type of pension reform, the 
generosity of future pension benefits is reduced, and/or it is made more difficult 
for future retirees to claim benefits or other publicly financed transfers. Can we 
predict in which countries such reforms will be more extreme or will be imple-
mented more quickly, and in which countries these changes will be introduced 
more gradually? If it is difficult for experts to make such predictions, it is hardly 
possible for ordinary people to do so. The only certainty is that pension systems 
will become less generous. However, the pace at which the pension reform pro-
cess occurs is likely to vary greatly across countries.
Some individuals migrate internationally. According to the literature, the decision 
about whether and where to migrate depends on a number of factors. Among the 
most important factors are differences in the standard of living between countries. 
For economic migrants, these differences can be measured by the gap between the 
available wage at home and abroad. Migrants are usually also aware of the avail-
ability and the generosity of public transfers in the receiving country. Of these 
transfers, old-age pension transfers are the largest. But for migrants, who tend to 
be young, the issue of pension benefit levels is usually too remote to factor into 
their migration decisions. Thus, migrants are more likely to think about access to 
short-term income from unemployment or social assistance schemes than about 
income in retirement. However, when income allocation over the life course is 
considered, old-age pensions are quite significant.
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205Under most legal frameworks, benefits from voluntary additional pension schemes 
are transferable across borders. In most cases, however, the benefits from such 
additional schemes are small compared to the benefits from basic schemes, which 
are usually harmonised ex-post according to either binational or multinational 
agreements. This ex-post harmonisation does not reduce the ex-ante uncertainty 
that matters for migration decisions.
Our aim is to analyse migration decisions made in a hypothetical institutional 
environment that undergoes (also hypothetical) changes. The hypothetical cases 
are based on assumptions that reflect the general pension landscape, and the dom-
inant forecasts of how this landscape will change in the pension literature.
We focus on permanent migrants who (if they move) plan to work legally and 
retire in the destination country. Temporary or return migrants, as well as migrants 
who engage in unregistered work, are thus beyond the scope of our paper. For 
temporary migrants who work legally, bilateral agreements or the harmonisation 
of European pension entitlements matter more than the pension system in the 
destination country. Migrants who work temporarily in the shadow economy only 
benefit from the difference in the available wages between their home country and 
their destination country. 
Our main hypothesis is that a decision to migrate that does not take into considera-
tion pension entitlements might not be optimal from the point of view of individual 
discounted lifetime incomes. The other side of that hypothesis is that awareness of 
lifetime income sensitivity to migration decisions may change actual migration 
patterns. Our assumption is that people are increasingly aware of the need for pen-
sion reforms that will lead to reductions in the generosity of pension benefits. 
Large migration flows could change the sustainability of pension systems in both 
sending and receiving countries. We do not analyse that effect, since it can hardly 
be perceived ex-ante when migration decisions are taken. Moreover, flows of per-
manent labour migrants between countries will not significantly influence the 
probability of a pension system reform, as they are too small to have a lasting 
impact on the demographic structure of the population (see Bijak et al., 2013). We 
therefore analyse the impact of expectations regarding pension system reforms on 
migration, but not the impact of migration flows on pension systems.
2 PENSION DRIVERS BEHIND MIGRATION DECISIONS
In most countries, pension reforms are being discussed or have already been 
implemented. Thus, public awareness of the inevitability of diminishing pension 
generosity has grown. In light of these reforms, people expect to retire later, to 
have smaller benefits in the future, or to need more supplementary savings for 
their old age. However, all of the existing empirical analyses on this topic have 
focused on expectations or observed changes in the behaviour of people already 
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206 (2014) for Japan, Boeri and Brugiavini (2008) for Italy, or Dominitz and Manski 
(2006) for the United States. To our knowledge, our paper is the first attempt to 
include pension wealth and pension expectations in the analysis of migration. 
Given this context, the following question arises: Will international migration lead 
to better, similar, or worse pension prospects for individuals? For instance, migra-
tion from a country where levels of pension generosity are decreasing quickly or 
steeply to a country where the reform process is occurring more gradually may 
lead to an increase in the lifetime income of an individual (assuming his/her wages 
remain the same), and vice versa. Thus, the pace and the extent of pension reforms 
in both countries will affect the outcome of migration, defined as the discounted 
lifetime income after migration. However, such theoretical and practical consid-
erations may not enter into the individual’s decision about whether to migrate.
Ambiguous expectations related to pension reforms cannot be analysed on the 
basis of data. In the second half of the 20st century – again, thanks to the demo-
graphic dividend – pension systems were very stable and predictable public insti-
tutions, and thus became a “natural” element of the institutional structure of  Euro-
pean countries. The availability and generosity of other benefits may have fluctu-
ated, but pensions were never threatened. In order to protect migrants, countries 
concluded bilateral or multilateral agreements on procedures for the establish-
ment, the payment, and the financing of pension benefits for people who had 
worked in more than one country.2 Because they felt protected by these agree-
ments, most people did not take into account how their decision to migrate would 
affect their pension benefits. However, these social security and pension institu-
tions are no longer stable. Moreover, the agreements to protect migrants are retro-
active. This means they are activated ex-post, after a person finishes working 
career. When these institutions were stable, this system was sufficient.
Today, however, these existing regulations seem insufficient. This is the subject of 
not only professional but also of public debates. The media are full of messages 
stressing pension system problems. So potential migrants are probably increas-
ingly aware of the need for pension reforms and other measures aimed at reducing 
expenditures in response to changing demographic structures. Thus, potential 
migrants are increasingly seeking ex-ante information on the coming changes. If 
individuals are unable to get such information, they may reconsider their migra-
tion plans because of risk aversion. Moreover, countries may apply (openly or 
surreptitiously) policies or regulations that are less beneficial for immigrants than 
for locals. For example, a country’s pension system may provide more generous 
benefits to workers who contributed to the social security insurance for longer 
periods of time. Even if such policies have not yet been implemented, potential 
migrants may be worried about future pension system changes. 
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207There are two broad strands of migration literature. The first strand focuses on 
macroeconomic theoretical models and empirical approaches, while the second 
focuses on the microeconomic analysis of migration decisions. Pension systems 
are not analysed separately as a factor that influences migration flows, as they are 
usually included in the destination country welfare system. At the macro level, 
researchers have analysed the fiscal effects or the net effects (the net present value 
of taxes and contributions paid by the migrant minus the welfare benefits received 
by migrant households). Over the last decade, the fiscal impact of immigration has 
become an increasingly important topic in policy debates (OECD, 2013). Recent 
examples of research on this issue include a study by Chojnicki and Ragot (2016) 
that focused on the impact of migration policy on the tax burden associated with 
the ageing population in France, and a study by Kaczmarczyk (2015) that described 
the effects of Ukrainian migration on Poland. 
Microeconomic analyses have attempted to identify the drivers of the decision to 
migrate. Whether an individual decides to migrate depends on a number of fac-
tors. Starting in the 1960s, the theoretical literature focused on the theory of 
human capital investment. Most of this literature explained movements based on 
Hicks’ (1932) idea that the main cause of migration is the difference between the 
wage levels in the home country and in a destination country. The upfront costs of 
migration were considered an investment that should be followed by a payoff in 
the future; i.e., higher wages. If wages measure returns to individual human capi-
tal, migration increases these returns (Borjas 1987; 1999). In the last decades of 
the 20th century, researchers suggested that differences in welfare state arrange-
ments across countries may also influence the decision about where to migrate. 
These studies investigated whether migrants (or asylum seekers) move to coun-
tries with more generous welfare systems, and if they do, what type of migrant 
they are. They found that migration decisions are mainly influenced by the avail-
ability of short-term unemployment and family benefits (see Borjas, 1999; McKin-
nish, 2007; De Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2009; Kurekova, 2013; Josifidis et al., 2014). 
Some researchers, such as Razin and Wahba (2015), suggested that social security 
benefits could be more important to lower educated migrants, as they provide 
insurance against higher labour market risk. Generally, the welfare magnet 
hypothesis in the migration literature argues that the generosity of welfare systems 
may influence both the quantity and the skill composition of migration flows (Bor-
jas, 1999; Razin and Wahba, 2015). However, in these studies, welfare systems 
were analysed as a whole, and pension systems were not treated separately.3 
There is no existing literature on the role of pension system benefits in the deci-
sion to migrate, even though decisions about when and where to migrate influence 
not only a worker’s wages, but also his/her income after retirement. The debate on 
social security in times of demographic change made has led many developed 
3 One of the reasons could be the small size of the retired migrant population in the most popular immigration 
countries. The migrants who arrived in Western Europe in the 1960s and the 1970s are approaching retire-
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208 countries to reform their pension systems (see, e.g., OECD, 2015). Some countries 
have introduced reforms that are more “actuarially fair”, with a stronger link 
between pension benefits and individual contributions. In other countries, there is 
a broad spectrum of redistribution approaches, in which, for example, the replace-
ment rates depend not only on individual contributions, but on other factors as well. 
An important aim of every pension system is to ensure its fiscal sustainability while 
providing adequate retirement income to protect older people against poverty. 
In many countries, the reform process is ongoing, and insured individuals can be 
entitled to different pension benefit levels depending on their tenure and the time 
at which they entered the system. Reforms may affect the relationship between 
lifetime pension benefits and lifetime contributions (see, e.g., Fredriksen and 
Stølen (2017) for Norway), or they may change the relative pension wealth avail-
able to different generations (Miles and Iben, 2000). 
Our model contributes to the existing knowledge on microeconomic determinants 
of migration. We do not differentiate between highly skilled and low skilled 
migrants, and instead focus on all legal permanent labour migrants. We assume 
that refugees have other reasons for migrating, and that temporary migrants do not 
think about the pension benefits in a receiving country.
3 THEORETICAL MODEL
We attempt to extend the model as presented in Burda (1995). The basis for his 
approach was the assumption that observed migration is sluggish due to uncer-
tainty about the future development of wage differences between the home and 
the destination country, or about labour market conditions in general. Burda mod-
elled procrastination using the value of the option to wait for information.
In Burda’s basic model, a person can migrate in the first period, or postpone the 
decision until the next period. The migration costs are fixed and irreversible. As 
the benefits of migration are uncertain, waiting can allow for new information to 
become available. For the simple two-period analysis, an individual migrates in 
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where:
F – the upfront migration costs; 
r – the discount rate between periods 1 and 2;
W1 – the difference in income in period 1 between the home country and the des-
tination country – for simplicity, measured as the difference in wages;
W2G – the difference in wages in period 2 in a “good” scenario (favourable for 
migrants);
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209pG – the probability of the good scenario;
pB – the probability of the bad scenario;
and pG + pB = 1.
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 (2)
a person should postpone the decision about whether to migrate to period 2.
The left-hand side of the inequalities above is NPV1 – the net present value of 
expected income flows when migration takes place in period 1; and the right-hand 
side is NPV2 – the net present value of the expected income flows when migration 
takes place in period 2.
Burda (2005: 8) defined the function VW that could be called the option value of 
waiting. It is defined as “the excess of the value of the waiting strategy over the 
classical expected net present discounted value when migration is undertaken 
immediately”. Generally, migration occurs when this value equals zero; when it is 
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The value of this migration option decreases in the current wage gap and in the 
bad scenario wage gap in the second period, and increases in the fixed migration 
costs and the probability of the bad scenario. It is independent of the wage differ-
ence in the good scenario. The discount rate has an ambiguous effect on VW. 
The option value increases in r when (1 – pB)F >-pBWB2 and decreases in r when 
(1 – pB)F <-pBWB2.
In our model, the gain or the loss from the decision to migrate stems not only from 
the wage differential, but also from the old-age benefit differential. Instead of two 
periods, we have three periods. The second and third periods correspond to the 
first and second periods of the models in Burda (1995), respectively. If the deci-
sion to migrate is postponed to the second period, then in the initial period, the 
person is working and accumulating pension rights in a sending country. Thus, a 
decision to migrate can be taken at the beginning of the first or of the second 
period. In our model, the risk is associated not only with wage dynamics, but also 
with the pace of pension reforms in both countries. In the last period, a migrant’s 
pension benefit entitlement depends on the pension rights accrued in both the 
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210 3.1  MIGRATION WITH NO UNCERTAINTY ABOUT FUTURE PENSION 
SYSTEM RULES
First, let us consider the situation in which the rules of the pension system in the 
sending and receiving countries are known and constant. In this case, pension 
wealth depends on the linkage between wage levels, contributions paid, and pen-
sion benefits. Table 1 shows how pension entitlements should be incorporated into 
migration decisions.
Table 1
Returns to migration including pension entitlements without pension system reform






pG W2G + pB W2B
Retirement
B3 (W1, pGW2G + pBW2B)
Wait until 
p.2 Home country work
Work abroad
pG (–F + W2G)
Retirement
pG B3 (W2G) + BH
Stay Home country work Home country work Home country retirement
We introduced B3  (.) – the difference in pension benefits depending on the wage 
levels and the pension system rules in the destination country and in the home 
country. Here, we should account for BH; i.e., the pension rights an individual 
accrued in his/her home country before migration if he/she worked there in period 
1. The other variables are the same as in the Burda approach.
When a person migrates in the first period, NPV equals:
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As in the case without pension benefits, an individual should migrate in the first 
period when NPV1 > NPV2, and should wait until the second period when 
NPV1 < NPV2. 
The option value of waiting VW,B should now be VW (w1) (formula (3)) increased by 
a change in the discounted pension wealth when a person migrates in the second 
period rather than in the first period; i.e.:
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211It is the value of waiting for information on both wage development and the 
implemented pension system reforms. If the pension strongly depends on indi-
vidual wages, waiting until the second period allows the migrant to gain more 
knowledge about lifetime income (including old-age pension benefits).
Migrants can return to their home country before retirement. If they retire according 
to the regulations of their home country their pension rights have local and foreign 
components. We do not cover return migrants in our model, as we assume that the 
additional risk stemming from the two factors is much smaller for temporary 
migrants than it is for permanent migrants. We also do not cover migrants who 
return to their home country after retiring in their receiving country, since as retirees 
from a foreign system, they remain subject to the regulations of that system even if 
they are living abroad. Pension reforms and their unknown scope and time dynam-
ics do not directly affect decisions to return to the home country after retirement. As 
there is no pension system reform-dependent risk it is beyond the scope of our paper.
A person who migrates in the first period is treated as a local, while a person who 
migrates later has the status of a migrant. These two types of migrants may be 
affected differently by a reduction in future old-age benefits. This differentiation 
extends the model. Waiting has an additional value. Beyond including the conven-
tional risk of waiting, we include the risk that the replacement rate reduction in the 
destination country will be larger than it is in the source country (or vice versa). 
The second risk is the possibility that migrants will be penalised vis-à-vis locals. 
In the source country, the individual who migrated is by definition a local; while 
in the destination country, he is considered a local if he migrated early, and he is 
considered a migrant if he migrated late.
This expression should be negative in countries where individuals who contribute 
for a shorter period of time but with higher wages just before retirement could 
expect a higher ratio of lifetime pension benefits to lifetime contributions. That is 
the case in some older types of public defined-benefit pension systems in devel-
oped countries. 
To sum up, this simple example shows that expected pension wealth can have an 
impact on the optimal timing of retirement.
3.2 MIGRATION WITH UNCERTAIN PENSION REFORM
As we discussed above, many countries are considering or introducing changes to 
pension systems. As it is usually difficult to reach a broad consensus on the details 
of pension reforms (Holzmann, Orenstein and Rutkowski, 2003; Góra 2013), we 
assumed that there is some degree of uncertainty about future levels of pension 
wealth and the timing of the implementation of reforms. We assume that if reforms 
in one or both countries are implemented in period 2, they will influence the 
expected pension wealth of a migrant; but that if reforms are implemented in 
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212 Waiting until the second period to decide whether to migrate can allow the indi-
vidual obtain more information not only about wage differentials, but also about 
the potential impact of pension system reforms. 
Table 2 shows returns to migration when the direction or scope of the pension 
reform is uncertain.
Table 2
Returns to migration including pension entitlements with the pension system reform








qG B3G (W1, pGW2G + pBW2B )  








qG pG B3G (W2G) + BH
Stay Home country work
Home country 
work Home country retirement
Here, B3G (.) denotes the pension benefit depending on the wages and the pension 
system rules if the reform is favourable for future employees (a higher ratio of 
lifetime pensions to lifetime contributions),
B3B (.) – the pension benefit if the pension reforms in the destination country are 
less favourable for future employees than in the home country (a lower ratio of 
lifetime pensions to lifetime contributions),
and B3G (.) > B3B (.).
qG – the probability of the favourable pension reform scenario in the destination 
country,
qB – the probability of the unfavourable pension reform scenario in the destination 
country,
and qG + qB = 1.4
Reforms in the home country and in the foreign country are implemented in period 
2. Thus, in period 1, a potential migrant knows (or expects) changes with a certain 
probability; and in period 3, the pension rules for period 3 are known. Now, NPV 
when a person migrates in the first period equals:
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213NPV when the migration occurs in the second period after favourable outcomes in 












When NPV1 < NPV2 (the option value of waiting is positive), it is better to post-
pone migration. 
When we set W2e = pGW2G + pBW2B, then the option value of waiting for additional 
information available in period 2 is:
( )
( )







( ) ( )












3 2 3 1 2 3 1 2
1 2 2 2 2
 
3 2 3 1 2 3 1 2
1 2 2 2 2





1 1 1 1
1 , ,
1 1 1 1





G G G G G G e B B e
W H
G G G G B G e B B e
W H




q p B W q B W W q B W WBV w
r r r r
q p B W q B W W q B W WBV w
r r r r






= + + − − =
+ + + +
−
= + + − − =
+ + + +
−














The important parts of our model are the probabilities of wage developments in 
the labour markets of both the sending country and the receiving country, and the 
probabilities of favourable and unfavourable reforms in both countries. Waiting 
until the second period decreases the risk of exposure to low wage differentials 
and unfavourable pension reforms (from an individual point of view), but increases 
the risk of exposure to a penalty for migrants vis-à-vis locals, whereby workers 
with shorter tenures in the destination country pension system are disadvantaged 
relative to workers with longer tenures.
The greater the difference B3G (W1, W2e) – B3B (W1, W2e) is between “favourable” and 
“unfavourable” pension reform outcomes, the higher the option value of waiting. 
Larger pension entitlements for even short contributory periods in the home country 
also increase the value of waiting. Relatively high B3G decreases the value of wait-
ing, but it also depends on the probability of “bad” or “good” wage development.
In period 2, the person will decide to migrate if the situation is “good-good”, but 
may be uncertain about the optimal decision if the situation is mixed (“bad wage-
good pension” or “good wage-bad pension”). In both cases, NPV2 is lower than in 





































































in the “good-bad” case.
Contrary to the basic Burda model, a person may migrate in the second period 
even if the wage development scenario is unfavourable if the pension system 
changes provide for higher expected benefit levels at retirement in the destination 
country, thereby offsetting the lower wages.
4 GOING BEYOND THE BASIC MODEL
To the best of our knowledge, there are no data on the pension reform expectations 
of potential migrants over a horizon of decades. As it is impossible to test the 
model on real data, we have generated and discussed a number of hypothetical 
situations. Even if these expectations have little or no effect on current migration 
decisions, this may change as the pressure on pension systems becomes more 
acute. Our model is an attempt to create a conceptual framework for thinking 
about developments that will likely intensify as awareness grows of the impact of 
inevitable pension reforms on the generosity of retirement benefits. Thus, workers 
may be expected to become increasingly aware of how pension system changes 
will affect their lifelong wealth.
4.1 RELATIVE LEVEL OF WAGES
In line with Burda, our model starts with the standard assumption that migration 
only occurs when the expected wages in the destination country are higher than 
the wages in the home country. Thus, when the wages are the same or higher in the 
country of origin, people will decide not to migrate. The decision to stay is even 
more likely if people take migration costs into account.
Including pension benefits can change the optimal decision when the current or 
the expected pension formula gives more generous pension benefits for the same 
contributions. 
4.2 RELATIVE LEVEL OF PENSION BENEFITS
Two cases are possible: a person is considering migrating from the country with a 
less generous pension system to the country with a more generous system, or vice 
versa. When the generosity of the pension system is the same in both countries, 
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215In the more interesting case, the generosity of the pension system does not increase 
linearly with the contributory period, but individuals with a short working career 
in the destination country receive less than those who decided to migrate in the 
first period. Such a situation increases NPV1 ceteris paribus.
4.3 VESTING PERIOD
Whether migrants receive pension benefits after a short vesting period in the send-
ing country also matters. A positive change in pension wealth is more probable if 
a long minimum contributory period is a prerequisite for receiving pension bene-
fits from the home country. In such a case, migrating in the first period becomes 
more attractive. A similar situation occurs if the receiving country’s pension sys-
tem rewards long contributory periods. There are three possible cases: no vesting 
period in the destination country, a short vesting period in the destination country 
(a migrant is entitled to full pension benefits after working for just one period in 
the new country), a long vesting period (a migrant is entitled to full pension ben-
efits only after working for two periods in the new country). 
The no vesting period case concerns countries that offer a basic, usually a flat-rate 
pension benefit to every person at retirement age. Such a case simplifies the initial 
analysis of a payoff from migration. In our notation, a change in the discounted 
pension wealth when a person migrates in the second period relative to when a 
person migrates in the first period – equation (6) – equals zero.
The second case, with the short vesting period, is the one presented in the models 
above. 













… decreasing the option value of waiting until period 2.
A long vesting period can be a way to treat natives and migrants differently in the 
pension system, just as regulations that have been discussed or adopted in existing 
welfare schemes aim to limit access to short-term social benefits, and especially 
social assistance (see, e.g., Fernandes 2016).
4.4 RISK OF A PENSION SYSTEM REFORM
In our model, the implementation of pension reforms in the sending country as 
well as in the destination country will happen in the second period. The reforms 
will not be coordinated, so they will generate different outcomes for workers. The 
reforms will inevitably lead to a reduction in the generosity of the systems. With 
probability qG, the changes will be favourable for the migrant, and with probabil-
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216 that for the same value of contributions paid, a person receives higher pension 
benefits in period 3 than he/she would if he/she had not migrated.5 In our model, 
we can analyse two types of problems, namely: (1) how pension reforms will 
affect workers’ lifetime income assuming they actually migrate; and (2) how pen-
sion reform expectations affect migration decisions. Let us first assume that the 
workers in question know the values of those probabilities. In this case, higher qG 
influences discounted pension wealth in an ambiguous way – i.e., depending on 
whether pensions are closely linked to wages.
( )3 2
2 –(1 )
G G G G














Pension reforms may positively or negatively affect a migrant’s lifetime income 
depending on the timing and the scale of the reforms in the sending country and in 
the destination country. The actual outcome will depend on the comparison of 
pension reform developments. Ex-ante, workers can only approximate the proba-
bilities of elements of such developments, as these are subjective probabilities 
based on their expectations.
4.5 PERCEIVED RISK OF A PENSION SYSTEM REFORM
Workers are generally not aware of the possible positive or negative pension out-
comes of their potential migration; or if they take such outcomes into account, 
future pension income is likely only one of a range of factors they are considering. 
We assume that this awareness will increase, and could start to affect migration 
decisions. Whether pension benefit levels represent a stronger or a weaker motiva-
tion to migrate will depend on subjective perceptions of pension reform risk. 
However, the growing awareness of the possible impact of pension reforms may 
also weaken the motivation to migrate, because of human risk aversion. Unpre-
dictable old-age pension system reforms will frighten workers, who will prefer to 
stay rather than to migrate.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we pointed out that uncertainty about the future outcomes of par-
ticipation in basic/public pension systems will increasingly affect migration deci-
sions. While people are becoming more aware of the inevitability of pension 
reforms, the exact timing and the scale of future pension reforms are uncertain. 
Pension benefits should be taken into account in addition to other migration driv-
ers when analysing changes in returns to human capital after migration. This anal-
ysis expands the literature on how welfare systems affect mobility patterns, which 
has up to now focused mainly on short-term welfare benefits. 
5 We analyse the pension reforms in the destination country, but the results for the unfavourable reform or the 
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217According to microeconomic analyses of individual decisions about whether and 
where to migrate, the key driver of migration is the difference in wages. The lit-
erature has also suggested that the availability of generous short-term social ben-
efits could motivate migration decisions. In this paper, we have attempted to 
extend the list of factors that could influence migration decisions by adding 
expected differences in the generosity of old-age pension benefits, and by show-
ing that ongoing pension reforms introduce uncertainty about the level of pension 
benefits that will be available to workers after migration. Smaller or larger pension 
reforms will probably moderate rather than encourage migration.
Our main conclusions are:
– Today, when most countries have completed or are in the last stage of the 
demographic transition, people may make sub-optimal migration decisions 
if they do not take into consideration future wealth from pension benefits. 
– Even if potential migrants know the current rules of the pension systems in 
both the sending and the receiving countries, they face uncertainty because 
of the risk of future pension system reforms. They may experience a 
reform-driven decrease in welfare stemming from the scope and the timing 
of the reforms in the receiving country vis-à-vis the scope and the timing 
of the reforms in the sending country.
– Including expected pension benefits in the analysis of migration drivers 
may change the optimal timing of migration.
– The more risk averse potential migrants are, the less motivated they will be 
to migrate when they are aware of the inevitability of pension reforms.
These are forward-looking conclusions based on a theoretical model that includes 
new factors reflecting developments that have just started to affect migration 
decisions.
Based on our findings we also see several areas of possible future research expand-
ing our approach. First, the discount factor can change in time. Here e.g. the 
assumption about the hyperbolic discounting by individuals (see Frederick, 
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2002) can to some extent explain why people do 
not take benefits from the pension system into consideration in their migration 
decisions. Second, in future, when data on migration and retirement behaviour in 
the reformed pension systems are available, it would be worth adding empirical 
analysis to the theoretical model. 
Disclosure statement 












































44 (2) 203-219 (2020)
218 REFERENCES
1. Bijak, J. [et al.], Population Ageing, Population Decline and Replacement 
Migration in Europe. In: M. Kupiszewski, ed. International Migration and the 
Future of Populations and Labour in Europe. The Springer Series on Demo-
graphic Methods and Population Analysis, vol 32, pp. 245-263. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-90-481-8948-9_14
2. Boeri, T. and Brugiavini, A., 2008. Reforms and Women Retirement Plans. 
IZA Discussion Paper, No. 3821. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0042-7092.2007. 
00700.x 
3. Borjas, G., 1987. Self-selection and the earnings of immigrants. American 
Economic Review, 77, pp. 531-553.
4. Borjas, G., 1999. Immigration and Welfare Magnets. Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics, 17(4), pp. 607-637. https://doi.org/10.1086/209933
5. Burda, M., 1995. Migration and the option value of waiting. The Economic 
and Social Review, 27(1), pp. 1-19.
6. Chojnicki, X., and Ragot, L., 2016. Impacts of Immigration on an Ageing 
Welfare State: An Applied General Equilibrium Model for France. Fiscal 
Studies, 37, pp. 258-284. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5890.2015.12059
7. De Giorgi, G. and Pellizzari, M., 2009. Welfare migration in Europe. Labour 
Economics, 16(4), pp. 353-363. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2009.01.005
8. Dominitz, J. and Manski, C. F., 2006. Measuring pension-benefit expectations 
probabilistically. Labour, 20, pp. 201-36. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9914. 
2006.00343.x
9. Fernandes, S., 2016. Access to Social Benefits for EU Mobile Citizens: “Tour-
ism” or Myth? Policy Paper, No 168.
10. Frederick, S., Loewenstein F. and O’Donoghue T., 2002. Time discounting 
and time preference: a critical review. Journal of Economic Literature, 40, pp. 
351-401. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.40.2.351
11. Fredriksen, D. and Stølen, N. M., 2017. Life time pension benefits relative to 
life time contributions. International Journal of Microsimulation. 10(2), pp. 
177-207.
12. Góra, M., 2013. Political economy of pension reforms: selected general issues 
and the Polish pension reform case. IZA Journal of Labor & Development, 2: 
p. 2. https://doi.org/10.1186/2193-9020-2-2
13. Holzmann, R., Orenstein, M. A. and Rutkowski, M., 2003. Pension Reform in 
Europe: Process and Progress. Washington: The World Bank. https://doi.
org/10.1596/0-8213-5358-6
14. Josifidis, K., Pucar, E. and Srdic, S., 2014. Labour migration flows: EU8+2 vs 
EU-15. Journal of Business Economics and Management, 15, pp. 41-55. 
https://doi.org/10.3846/16111699.2013.841283
15. Kaczmarczyk, P., 2015. Burden or Relief? Fiscal Impacts of Recent Ukrainian 












































44 (2) 203-219 (2020)
21916. Kureková, L., 2013. Welfare Systems as Emigration Factor: Evidence from 
the New Accession States. Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(4), pp. 
721-739.
17. McKinnish, T., 2007. Welfare-Induced Migration at State Borders: New Evi-
dence from Micro-Data. Journal of Public Economics, 91, pp. 437-450. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.09.002
18. Miles, D. and Iben, A., 2000. The Reform of Pension Systems: Winners and 
Losers Across Generations in the United Kingdom and Germany. Economica, 
67, pp. 203-228. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0335.00204
19. OECD, 2013. International Migration Outlook 2013. Paris: OECD.
20. OECD, 2015. Recent pension reforms. In: Pensions at a Glance 2015: OECD 
and G20 indicators. Paris: OECD. https://doi.org/10.1787/pension_glance-
2015-4-en
21. Okumura, T. and Usui, E., 2014. The effect of pension reform on pension-
benefit expectations and savings decisions in Japan. Applied Economics, 
46(14), pp. 1677-1691. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2013.870654
22. Razin, A. and Wahba, J., 2015. Welfare Magnet Hypothesis, Fiscal Burden, 
and Immigration Skill Selectivity. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, (117), 
pp. 369-402. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12092
